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 The EU’s newly launched European Neighborhood Policy is a fascinating case study in organizational management theory of how the Commission strategically adapted enlargement policies to expand its foreign policy domain.  From the use of Action Plans, regular reports and negotiations to the larger conceptualization and use of socialization and conditionality, the development of the policy shows significant mechanical borrowing from the enlargement strategies. Given the lack of the membership carrot, the question is whether such adaptation from enlargement can promote political reforms in the ENP countries, which are generally poor, often autocratic and in some cases embroiled in domestic conflicts. 


As the newcomers to the EU vied for membership during the last decade, the European Union (EU) exerted a tremendous influence on their domestic political systems (Kelley 2004a and b, Vachudova 2005, Schimmelfennig 2003, Jacoby 2004). Before 2004, the Commission began to consider how enlargement would change the EU’s external relations, and how the EU could extend the reform stimulus of enlargement to the would-be new neighbors of the Union.
 In May 2004, the commission published a paper detailing the new policy. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is a framework for cooperation between the EU and all North African and Middle Eastern EU sea-border states, and the land-border states of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova (the WNIS states), and also the states of the Caucasus. Russia has its own special relationship and is not part of the ENP. The goal is to promote a set of political, economic and security-related reforms in the neighboring states. While “distinct” from the issue of potential membership, ENP offers “a privileged relationship” based on “mutual commitment to common values” such as human rights and democracy. The strategy paper states that: “The level of the EU’s ambition in developing links with each partner through the ENP will take into account the extent to which these values are effectively shared”(13). This is essentially a softly phrased reference to conditionality: the more a country conforms to EU values, the closer it can cooperate with the EU. 
The EU has clearly modeled the ENP on the enlargement process. Drawing on a rich multidisciplinary body of work on policy learning and organizational adaptation, the first part of this paper discusses how path dependency, role conceptualizations and institutional domain expansion have led the Commission to strategically adapt enlargement policy to the ENP. Through analysis of primary documents and interviews with Commission officials, officials of ENP countries, and human rights experts,​[1]​ I show how the Commission’s conceptualization and development of the ENP has drawn on multiple elements from the past enlargement experiences. Like enlargement, the result is a domain expanding policy that combines socialization and conditionality strategies. The paper then addresses the critical question: Is this policy extension likely to work without the incentive of enlargement? How do the ENP countries compare with the enlargement countries 10-12 years ago? Will the potential of  “everything but institutions” (Prodi 2002) motivate democratic and human rights reforms?​[2]​ 

From enlargement to the ENP: path dependency, learning and adaptation 
The ENP is a result of a combination of policy learning and adaptation from the enlargement experience in response to the changed post-enlargement environment. It is shaped by path-dependency: the influence of historical choices on present institutional options (Pierson 1996). But it also results from a combination of learning and adaptation. Learning is the application of insights about causal relationships from past behaviors to solve new problems (Day and Groves 1975, March and Olson 1989, Hass 1991, Stein 1994), whereas adaptation is the application of prior causal beliefs to new situations. Hass notes that with adaptation, “behavior changes as actors add new activities (or drop old ones) without examining the implicit theories underlying their programs,” whereas with learning, “behavior changes as actors question original implicit theories underlying programs.” (72). Such learning and adaptation can happen at the individual level, or, when individual experiences are integrated, at the institutional level (Soest and Wink 2001). Such phenomenons are often difficult to ascertain, but the close study of enlargement and the ENP provides an extraordinary example.
The path dependency of the ENP is strong. Its raison d’etre is enlargement. The ENP originated to address the fact that upcoming enlargement would make Ukraine, Belarus and eventually Moldova new land-neighbors. This raised concerns about security, immigration, and political and economic cooperation. The issue formally arose in late 2002 in the General Affairs and External Relations Council and at the Copenhagen European Council. From the beginning the emphasis was on using the new environment to promote reforms based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The ENP therefore came about because of the historical enlargement of the Union, but also in the light of the relative weakness of past policies towards these ENP countries in promoting these values. 
The ENP is also an extension and adaptation of the Commission’s active foreign policy role during enlargement. The ENP has largely been conceptualized within Directorate General (DG) enlargement. Only recently was it transferred to the external relations DG. This is consistent with March and Olson’s argument that actors take on roles, which then in turn shape their behavior (1989). These roles often emerge from past experiences (Pierson 1996). Indeed, through the enlargement process, the commission came to perceive itself as an important foreign policy actor and it frequently refers to the 2004 enlargement as the EU’s most successful foreign policy. As a commission official recounted: with its plethora of rhetorical devices the Council of Ministers may have appeared as the most influential arbitrator of EU foreign policy. But when it came to “real” foreign policy impact of the EU in the last decade, the power lay with the Commission.​[3]​ While one can debate the relative influence of Council and Commission foreign policy, the EU Commission administrated the enlargement policies. The Commission has likewise conceptualized the ENP and will implement it. While the Commission will still handle enlargement processes for Turkey and the Balkan countries, the ENP enables the Commission to continue playing a significant, and perhaps even stronger, role in external affairs. 
This is a classic example of what organizational management theories would call domain creation and offense (Miles and Cameron 1982). Sociological studies from the 1950-60s showed how organizations such as the March of Dimes reacted when they met their goals, and how they found other tasks rather than dissolving (Sills 1957). While the task of enlargement continues and while the Commission is in no danger of dissolving, this extension of the commissions’ foreign policy mandate resembles a strategic adaptation (Whetten 1987, 349) to changes in the external environment. Organization may “expand activities that the organization already does well” (Domain offense), or “replace one set of activities with another” (Domain substitution), or “supplement current domain activities with new domains, primarily through diversification” (Domain creation). 
Such organizational adaptation is occurring on the larger institutional level as a result of it first occurring on an individual level. The similarities in the ENP policy and that of enlargement are partly because many of the commission officials who worked on enlargement transferred to the ENP. The ENP now falls under the new External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner whose title has indeed been amended to “Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy”. However, the ENP has its own task force, headed by Michael Leigh, Deputy Director General in DG External Relations, who was once the Commission’s chief negotiator with the Czech Republic. He also used to be Director in DG Enlargement. His assistant, Helen Campbell, has an enlargement background as a country Desk Officer for Bulgaria. She was secretary of the Association Committee, and responsible for the Europe Agreement Association Council, Joint Parliamentary Committee, coordination of the Regular Report, the Accession Partnership, the NPAA, general briefing for the negotiation sector, and coordination of statistics. Also from the enlargement team is Rutger Wissels, now the Deputy Head of the ENP taskforce, and Axel Walldén, now in charge of political and conceptual issues for the ENP. The top task force officials thus all have enlargement backgrounds. 
This led to some direct mechanical borrowing from enlargement experiences. The evidence for the policy transfer therefore lies not only in individual positions, but also in the evolution of key documents and the final policy’s similarities to enlargement. Thus, some early drafts of the Action Plans were modeled directly on the Association Agreements used for the recent accessions, although the Action Plans were not legal documents. There were even sporadic references to the Copenhagen criteria, which were created in 1993 as thresholds of political standards for membership. Former Commission President Romani Prodi said: “We need to set benchmarks to measure what we expect our neighbours to do in order to advance from one stage to another. We might even consider some kind of “Copenhagen proximity criteria (2002)”.  One Commission official even noted that in the very early in-house ENP drafts, the name of a recent candidate state would sometimes accidentally appear. Since then the language has been modified significantly, but the imitation of enlargement templates is still evident. 
Seven proposed Action Plans came out in December 2004 after about a year of ministerial-level negotiations.​[4]​ The first seven countries are: Ukraine, Tunisia, Morocco, Moldova, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In February 2005, Ukraine and Moldova’s Action Plans were the first to be finalized, and in April 2005 the Council confirmed the intentions of developing Action Plans for Egypt, Lebanon and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Each 3-5 year Action Plan lays out several overarching “priorities for action.” While about 80 percent of the Action Plans focus on issues other than political conditions, these initial “priorities for action” overwhelmingly focus on political reforms similar to those stressed towards prior accession countries. They focus on strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, and they frequently mention the conduct of specific upcoming elections. They also focus on media freedom and freedom of expression. More detailed actions then follow the priorities. While some are broad, many pinpoint specific reforms. Cabinet level officials expressed positive surprise by how willing the first seven partner countries were to include human rights and democratization issues in the Action Plans. For example, Ukraine’s Action Plan, negotiated even before the pivotal 2005 elections, mentions “implement the recommendations of the UN committee of the Rights of the Child of 2002, (5)” and “join the Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) and implement relevant recommendations, including a revision of the Ukrainian national strategy for the fight against corruption.”(5).
Other ENP mechanisms are also adapted from enlargement. There will be two types of monitoring: a joint assessment, and a unilateral EU report, the so-called ‘regular country report’. Making a clear mental connection to enlargement, Commission staff stress that the Action Plans cannot solicit the same content and specificity as the Accession Agreements did, but that the regular Commission reports will emphasize human rights strongly. The first report will come two years after the Action Plans begin and a second report will follow in the third year. Ukraine and Moldova insisted on a short time frame to revisit the membership question. Again, this evaluation tool of an “annual report” resembles the use of such “progress reports” for accession countries. And, as with enlargement, the Commission has made efforts to ensure that IMF and World Bank attention to the reports to boost the their leverage.
While one of the dangers of continuity in personnel from enlargement to ENP is a misplaced cookie-cutter approach, a potentially offsetting advantage is the ability of such officials to reap the benefits of institutional learning (Soest and Wink 2001, Stein 1994, Hass 1991). One example of institutional learning is the principle of differentiation embedded in the ENP. Initially enlargement proceeded in waves, and negotiations on different chapters were opened simultaneously with countries in a given group. However, the EU was aware that grouping countries could dampen their individual progress. Thus in 1999 the EU tried to abandon the language of “waves” for the “regatta principle” of a more flexible, multi-speed accession process. However, this largely failed, because there was by then tremendous pressure on the commission to let in certain countries as a group. Although countries like Moldova and Ukraine would prefer not to be under the same umbrella policy as Syria, the extensive emphasis in the ENP documents on the principle of differentiation results from this enlargement experience. Indeed, commission members have been at pains to stress that the EU will not deal uniformly with all ENP countries. Officials form ENP countries see differentiation as an important advantage of the ENP and those who have been first to sign Action Plans are optimistic that they can progress in their relations with the EU without being held back by laggards.​[5]​ European Commissioner for Regional Policy, Danuta Hübner, has said that it would be “absurd” to treat all the countries as a single block (2004). Although there is already some grouping by when countries completed Action Plans, the EU’s response to changes in Ukraine after the 2005 election suggests differentiation is real. 
There are many other examples of learning and adaptation in the ENP, but strategically the most prominent are the use of conditionality and socialization. The Commission has debated widely how to apply conditionality and how to structure incentives to maximize the advantages of conditionality even in the absence of the possibility of eventual membership. The tools of socialization under enlargement are also evident in the ENP’s structure of processes and dialogues between the commission and ENP countries, the engagement with domestic actors and the use of social influence. I discuss these facets more below.

The transfer of strategic thinking: conditionality and socialization
The conditionality component
The Communication on Wider Europe of March 2003 offered a quid pro quo much like that of accession: “In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms…. the countries…. should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital” (EU commission 2003, 4). As with enlargement, the strategy paper and the Action Plans thus all tie progress into future reevaluations of the relationship. The strategy paper notes that: “The ambition and the pace of development of the EU’s relationship with each partner country will depend on its degree of commitment to common values, as well as its will and capacity to implement agreed priorities.”(8) This language has made it into the Action Plans themselves: “The pace of progress of the relationship will acknowledge fully [country name]’s efforts and concrete achievements in meeting commitments to common values.”(1) As one commission official put it: “The quid pro quo will not be forgotten.”
While the EU has used conditionality in other aspects of its democracy and human rights policies, this most strongly resembles the conditionality of the enlargement. However, as with conditionality in general (World Bank 1999), the enlargement conditionality was not without its problems. The chances of success frequently depended on the extent to which people in power thought that compliance would affect them (Kelley 2004a, 50-52). Even when the EU’s leverage with candidate countries was at its peak, the EU could not base its strategy entirely on political conditionality. The multitude of other membership criteria, competing strategic and economic interests, and intra-EU differences over how to deal with individual candidate countries compromised the credibility of the conditionality (Ibid, 41). And when the EU failed to substantially reward reformers, this created resentment (Youngs, 2001a, 27-28). 
 Having experienced these difficulties, but also wanting to replicate the successful elements of enlargement conditionality, the Commission and the Council has debated greatly how to design and apply conditionality. This debate provides good evidence of the learning process within organizations like the Commission. The United Kingdom initially wanted strict conditionality with a matrix of rewards for certain reforms. In the end, the commission regarded this as too inflexible. As a commission official explained: “ENP consistency is very problematic, because we do not have a uniform aquis. It is much more complicated. One conclusion we drew was that we couldn’t just take a line of strict conditionality. We started like that with the ENP design: we wanted to set very precise benchmarks which would moderate the ambition of the relationship. … But you cannot get most partners to accept this logic within the concept of joint ownership. The new policy is that the overall level of shared values will affect the degree to which ambitions are shared. The countries that push more shared values will get priority in financial support, greater and speedier access to the internal market. We realize that we will have a gradual approach, but the strategy paper is very explicit about the values-ambitions link.” 
Since the original “Wider Europe” communication, the language of conditionality, benchmarks and gradual rewards has therefore been toned down. The language originally noted that “engagement should be introduced progressively, and be conditional on meeting agreed targets for reform,” and talked about the “setting of clear and public objectives and benchmarks,”(16) and noted “the full implementation … of the provisions in the existing Agreements remains a necessary precondition for any new  [institutional and contractual agreements].”(17) The final strategy paper replaced such rhetoric with language on how ‘the ambitions’ of the EU in forging cooperation would be based on the ‘degree’ to which values were shared. Thus, while the Commissions Wider Europe Communication (2003) used the word “benchmark” or “target,” 14 times, sometimes in bold typeface, the strategy paper uses each of these words only once, but mentions “incentive,” a softer concept, more frequently. “Benchmarking” appears once in the Action Plan with Ukraine, and only in connection with enterprise policy. However, conditionality remains up front: “The pace of progress of the relationship will acknowledge fully Ukraine’s efforts and concrete achievements in meeting commitments to common values (1).” But the strategy paper also stresses that: “the EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners.” (8) This intentional ambiguity is rooted in a central dilemma of credibility learned from enlargement: if the EU wants to reward partial progress in certain areas, the country may infer that lack of progress in other areas is acceptable. 

Packaging the incentives: what the ENP offers and what it does not offer
The core of conditionality, of course, is the existence of incentives. This presents the EU with a challenge because, with the exception of the WNIS countries for which -- as discussed later – the ENP may become a springboard for membership, the carrot is smaller. Without the membership prospective, the ENP countries may not be motivated to undertake domestic reforms (Grabbe 2004, Lavenex 2004, 695).  Prodi has said the ENP offers “Everything but institutions” (2002). But this may eventually be quite problematic. As The European Round Table of Industrialist on the EU’s Neighborhood Policy have argued, creating a form of the European Economic Area (EEA) will deprive the ENP countries of a voice in the Single Market rules they will be expected to follow (ERT Enlargement Working Group 2004). Although the benefits may be substantial, will governments agree to submit to a system of rules in which they have little decision-making power? While this has not deterred the current EEA countries, the ENP countries may find their interests less protected by coinciding preferences of member states. Further, the current EEA countries are without voice by choice, not by exclusion. Wary of such one-sided governance, Prodi has suggested that ‘everything but institutions’ “does not exclude the possibility of developing new structures with our neighbours at a later stage, if necessary. I am thinking of innovative concepts such as institutions co-owned by the partners (2002).” This may be a tough sell, however, as Tim Gould has pointed out.​[6]​ Therefore, to justify the viability of adapting the ENP from enlargement experience, the commission has carefully enumerated the possible benefits to the ENP countries. The proposed Action Plans offer a series of incentives: 
1.	A perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration, including a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and the possibility to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programs
2.	An upgrade in scope and intensity of political cooperation
3.	Opening of economies, reduction of trade barriers
4.	Increased financial support
5.	Participation in Community programs promoting cultural, educational, environmental, technical and scientific links
6.	Support for legislative approximation to meet EU norms and standards
7.	Deepening trade and economic relations

To select countries, the commission offers further benefits such as enhanced administrative cooperation, and a dialogue on visa cooperation, and for Moldova, the promise of a Commission Delegation and strong EU commitment to the settlement of the Transnistria conflict. Most reminiscent of the enlargement process, however, the plans also mention the possibility of a new enhanced contractual relationship. Ukraine and Moldova in particular care greatly about this, because they want to join the EU. But it is also something that, if it were to mean a contractual relations similar to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), other countries would care greatly about.
Indeed, the benefits from deepening economic cooperation may be substantial as elaborated for example by the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT Enlargement Working Group 2004). Fantini and Dodini (2005) also enumerate several possible “added values” such as enhanced trade preferences, development of interconnected infrastructure for energy and transportation, and participation in the EU Internal Market. ENP countries place great value on this.​[7]​ Further, the new Neighborhood Instrument that the commission will introduce in 2007 to manage the now diverse funding sources may entail a substantial increase in funding toward the ENP countries (Copsey and Mayhew 2005). The commission has proposed almost a doubling of funds to 15 billion Euros. The annual reports will be used for funding guidance. “It is not going to be hard conditionality, but it will affect how the pot of money gets allocated,” said one official. 
Other economic incentives derive from non-EU sources. The international financial institutions (IFIs) cooperated closely with the EU on the recent enlargement. On-going talks indicate the same will apply to the ENP. Commission Officials say they have already discussed the ENP policy with them and that they have promised to place weight on the regular reports. Commission officials therefore hope the reports can become a stamp of approval that will instill confidence in internal governance structures and therefore lead to increased investor confidence and greater foreign direct investment. The reports may even affect funding from the international financial institutions, thereby vesting the reports with more leverage. 
Although the ENP is removed from the question of membership, and although only the WNIS countries could possible aspire to join the EU someday, the EU clearly believes that, as in the case of enlargement, it has a set of incentives to offer the ENP countries, both political and economic (Hübner 2004). Prodi noted that: “The goal of accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can think of. But why should a less ambitious goal not have some effect? (2002)” The EU has therefore adapted conditionality to the ENP. However, as with enlargement, how strictly to adhere to conditionality presents a dilemma. This is encapsulated in a commission comment on the relationship with Belarus: “The EU faces a choice in Belarus: either leave things to drift – a policy for which the people of Belarus may pay dear and one which prevents the EU from pursuing increased cooperation on issues of mutual interest – or to engage, and risk sending a signal of support for policies which do to conform to EU values (European Commission 2003, 15).” As with enlargement, the EU is therefore trying to strike a balance between conditionality and soft diplomatic socialization, as discussed next. 

The Socialization component
Another great similarity to the enlargement process is the socialization component. Socialization is when actors generate behavior changes by creating reputational pressures through shaming, persuasion, and through other efforts to socialize state actors (Johnston 2001, 488). Studies of democratic transitions also show that external actors can work with domestic opposition to increase their voice and bargaining power (Burnell 2000, Vachudova 2005). Indeed, the EU increasingly sees itself as a normative or soft power (Manners 2002), which derives its global actor strength from the promotion of norms through engagement. In general, about 90 percent of democracy promotion funds go to non-governmental organizations (Young 2001a, 5-11).
During the enlargement process, the EU increasingly used socialization efforts in conjunction with conditionality (Kelley 2004a and b). EU officials traveled to candidate states to negotiate, but also to stimulate domestic debates on issues such as democracy, ethnic minority politics, and human rights. This belief in changing norms in societies also informed the strong emphasis on civil society forums and cooperation with non-governmental organizations. 
Socialization is again a main feature of the ENP, and the structure of the strategy resembles that of enlargement. The new ENP refers to a partnership, and the ENP home page lists the countries as “partners.” Cremona (2005) notes this may be a euphemism, but it is also an attempt at emphasizing dialogue, and ENP officials themselves use the partnership language and stress that the process of negotiating the Action Plans has been very bilateral.​[8]​ The Commission thus presents the ENP as “an offer made by the EU to its partners,” and based on “joint ownership.” The emphasis in the ENP is again heavily on contacts at multiple levels. Some officials from ENP countries report having daily contact with EU officials.​[9]​ As one EU official pointed out: “The process is extremely important. The medium is the message.” A Moldovan ENP official noted: “It wasn't an easy negotiation process but we managed to make functioning the joint ownership principle declared as one of core principles of the ENP. We can notice an improvement of our communication with the Commission starting with end of 2003 and we hope the further we will advance in the Action Plan implementation process the better our relationship will become.”​[10]​ This emphasis on soft diplomacy is also apparent in the EU’s efforts to contribute to the formulation of legislation by offering legal experts to the ENP countries though so-called twinning, which was also used during enlargement. 
The Action Plans’ extensive “value” language underscores that the normative changes are integral to the ENP project. Although the Commission (2004a) strategy paper stresses that “There can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities. These will be defined by common consent,”(8) the listed values are clearly those central to the EU. As Prodi put it: “The aim is to extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union. (2002)” Commission officials noted that referring to international norms in the Action Plans would legitimize those subjects for bilateral debate, and a large part of the policy’s mechanisms are specialized dialogues where low-level politics can provide socializing interaction. The commission is creating dedicated human rights dialogues with three ENP countries: Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan, and the negotiations of the Action Plans themselves presented a high-level dialogue.
During the enlargement process the EU encouraged the transformation of political forces by reaching out to the opposition parties in many candidate states (Vachudova 2005).  Similarly, the ENP strategy is building relationships through frequent interaction with domestic political actors. To socialize domestic actors towards EU values, the EU commission also cooperates with domestic NGOs, and funds the development of civil society. When negotiating the Action Plans, the EU aimed to align with reform-minded forces within the countries. As a commission official explained, although a government may be an autocracy, it still faces constraints. Several stakeholders have interests, even in non-democratic states: the church, the military, large wealth holders, and royal families. The EU hopes to provide an opportunity for reform minded forces to use the Action Plan objectives to put items on the agenda and promote change. 
The commission is also trying to emulate the “social influence” (Johnston 2001) dynamic that existed with the annual progress reports for candidate countries. The system of synchronized reports helped the Commission lock itself into a process of consistent objective reviews during the accession period. This Commission is imitating this mechanism in the ENP, for exactly the same reason. As one official noted: “The key is that this will be systematic. So it will happen in parallel with a number of other countries – this will force us to maintain a certain standard, by pinpointing certain problems.” 
Further, the annual reports are intended as tools to praise progress and to shame (Johnston 2001) countries for lack of reforms or gross violations of human rights. The Commission hopes that, as with enlargement, the publication of reports and differentiated progression towards benefits will create competitiveness among the partner countries. As one official said: “The countries have definitely been watching over each other’s shoulders.” Indeed, in July 2004, a commission official referred to the first seven countries to sign Action Plans as being in the “first wave,” and noted that if Ukraine’s elections did not meet democratic standards, then the European Council could still decide to kick Ukraine out of the “first wave.”​[11]​
In sum, the ENP is an effort to emulate the success of enlargement and extend it to a new commission domain. The policy has been shaped through a great deal of path dependency and adaptation. The similarities between the enlargement strategy and the ENP are thus many, most notably in the strategies of conditionality and socialization. Indeed, in the words of one official, the ENP is: “a diluted version of the enlargement policy.” Another said: “There is nothing new in the ENP except packaging.” However, there is not only adaptation, but also learning. Officials do appreciate some of the differences: “The ENP is introducing some elements from the experience of enlargement – how we treat political issues. It is easy for many to miss the difference. But it is fundamental in the official line. This is not a membership track. ENP is not about enlargement. The EU will always have neighbors. If we don’t have a developed policy, then there is a danger of copying the policy under enlargement mechanically. We can learn from it, but it is fundamentally different… The difference in leverage is fundamental. It is a methodological difference. Before, we could say: it is our club, we have the Copenhagen criteria. But with the ENP, we cannot impose values unilaterally.” The question is whether the enlargement model is appropriate and whether there has been too much adaptation and too little learning?
The EU itself makes a reference to enlargement within an ENP document, noting that: “The incentive for reform created by the prospect of membership has proved to be strong – enlargement has unarguably been the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument. (EU Commission 2003, 5)” There is clearly optimism that the better reference point for the new neighborhood policy will be enlargement and not the past plethora of other EU democracy promotion efforts.

Can the Commission replicate the success of the enlargement in the ENP?
It may be possible to produce economic reforms in the ENP countries under the ENP (Fantini and Dodini 2005). However, if the goal is achieving political reforms in the ENP countries similar to those achieved in the new 2004 member states, an important difference to consider is the lower starting points for the ENP countries. The ENP common values include “strengthening democracy and the rule of law, the reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption and organized crime; respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of media and expression, rights of minorities and children, gender equality, trade union rights and other core labour standards, and fight against the practice of torture and prevention of ill-treatment.”(EU Commission 2004a, 13)
As Table 1 and 2 show, most ENP countries have extensive human rights abuses, no democracy, and are poor. While the last decade brought a small decline in the new EU member states in the indicators for ethnic tensions, corruption, law and order and labor rights, this can be attributed to improved monitoring. However, the much larger decline in most ENP states’ indicators, including human rights and democracy, result from actual worsening over the last 10 years as transitions have brought more chaos and misuse of power. Subsequently, as both Table 1 and Figure 1 show, human rights conditions are worse in the ENP countries now than they were in the candidate countries in 1993. The state of democracy is worlds apart. Vachudova has argued that a condition for the enlargement policy’s success in the recent candidate countries has been the presence of political competition, and the EU’s ability to stimulate this competition (2005). However, while the average polity democracy score for the candidate states in 1993 was 8.36, the 2003 average score for the ENP countries is –1.00 and the standard deviation is large. Thus, the neighborhood countries differ considerably from the 1993 candidate countries in their stage of maturity towards the values the EU seeks to promote.






Physical Integrity rights index1	4.21  (1.92)	3.80  (1.26)	6.72 (1.42)	7.75 (0.65)	0 (worst) - 8 
Empowerment Rights Index2	3.71( 2.92)	2.26   (1.94)	7.90 (1.22)	8.33 (1.61)	0 (worst) - 10 
Freedom of the Press3		41.53 (17.69)		8.20 (7.46)	0 (best) - 107
Labor rights4	25.2  (5.86)	21.65 #  (5.69)	29.8( 4.16)	25.6( 5.57)	0 (worst) - 37.5 
Ethnic tensions5	4.08  (1.50)	4.42#    (1.46)	4.38   (1.30)	3.99 (1.04)	0 (worst) - 6 
Corruption5	3.05 ( .755)	2.25 #  (.753)	3.72   (.711)	2.76  (.697)	0 (worst) - 6 
Law and Order5	3.91   (.916)	4.24  # (.741)	4.65   (.616)	4.375   (.482)	0 (worst) - 6
Polity Democracy6	-.357   (6.18)	-1.00   (6.48)	8.36(1.80)	9.00   (1.26)	-10(worst) - +10
Sources:
1CIRI Index of torture, killings, disappearances and political imprisonment. Cingranelli, David and David Richards. 2004.
2CIRI index of Freedom of Association, Movement, speech, political participation and religious freedom. Cingranelli, David and David Richards. 2004. 
3 Reporters without borders, figures from 2004. http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=11715
4 Mosley and Uno 2004. Labor rights are for 2002, not 2003. 
5 Country Risk Group. Figures are for 1999, not 1993. PRS Group. 2004. 
6 Polity IV scores are for 2002, not 2003. Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2003)

GDP per capita also differs considerably between the two groups. In 1993, the EU candidates had an average GDP per capita in constant 1995 figures of $4333. The comparable 2003 figure for the ENP countries is only $2543, with the Caucasus and the WNIS countries falling at the bottom range. Indeed, if measured in constant 1995 figures, GDP per capita has barely increased in the WNIS states since 1993. Fantini and Dodini (2005) find a similar gap in 2003 World Bank Governance indicators.

Table 2: GDP per capita for comparative regions, 1993 and 2003 (standard deviation)
	EU enlargement	Average ENP	WNIS	Caucasus	Mediterranean
2003	6196 (4318)	2543 (4096)	1300 (876)	839 (121)	3649 (5256)
1993	4333 (3151)    	2200 (3723)	1259 (514)	511 (92)	3186 (4791)
In constant 1995 dollars. Source: World Development Indicators database
Note: Data on Libya missing

These differences matter, not just because they relate to the EU values, but also because they include important conditions for democratization. Although scholars still vigorously debate what the conditions for democracy are and why,​[12]​ key factors are exactly the ones most ENP countries lack: the elimination of absolute poverty; lack of gross income and power inequality; education and literacy; the resolution of domestic conflicts; a vibrant civil society and a flourishing market economy (Burnell 2000, 28). Some argue that strong Islamic fundamentalist pressures lowers prospects for democratization.​[13]​ Again, the candidate countries did not have such pressures, but some Mediterranean countries do. 
The fact that the ENP countries are lacking in many of these basic correlates of democracy and human rights, and that their starting points across a set indicators are significantly lower than that of the EU candidates in 1993 may produce skepticism about the prospects for reform. Add to this the difference in the EU’s historical relationship with these two sets of countries. 
Two differences stand out: Whereas there was tremendous goodwill towards the candidates in the early 1990s, the Cold War had prevented the EU from engaging extensively with these countries. Nor had the EU engaged heavily in democracy promotion efforts globally by the early 1990s. Therefore, the EU had an almost clean slate of interaction with these countries. 
In contrast, the EU has long had an active economic relationship with the ENP countries, and raised the issue of human rights and democracy with them for a decade. Further, since the early 1990s, the EU has augmented democracy promotion efforts globally.​[14]​ This may sound like an asset, but to the extent that these efforts have been ineffective, this history presents the ENP policy with a credibility problem.
Indeed, critics stress that EU democracy promotion lacks coordination, is ad-hoc, and “bedeviled by complexity and obfuscation.” (Crawford 2000, 90; Santiso 2002a,Youngs 2001a ). Börzel and Risse label it an overly simplistic “one-size-fits-all” approach (2004, 18). The Parliaments’ Annual Human Rights reports, issued since 1999, have been sporadic in country coverage and superficial in content. There has been no comparable systematic assessment of democracy. And although the EU has used political clauses in agreements with third countries, it has enforced only an extreme definition of respect for human rights and democracy. It has not consistently imposed sanctions or rescinded contractual aid or trade provisions when countries behaved non-democratically (Smith 1998). The correlation between democratic progress and aid allocations has been minimal, and the EU has tolerated hollow democratic institutions (Barkan 2000). Youngs argues that the EU has only pushed its normative agenda when strategically convenient (2004). ENP states may therefore discount the rhetoric in the strategy papers and the Action Plans.


Source: Cingranelli, David and David Richards (2004) and, and Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers (2003). Human rights data is for 2003, Democracy scores are for 2002 and do not account for the Rose revolution in Georgia or the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The Physical integrity index and the empowerment rights index run from 0 (worst) to 8 (best), while the Polity Democracy score runs from -10 (worst) to +10 (best).

Historical relations with the Mediterranean countries
In addition to the lower starting points just discussed, the EU’s historical relations with the ENP countries may undermine the credibility of the ENP. This is particularly true in the Mediterranean region where economic cooperation has been quite high in spite of questionable political systems and human rights conditions (see Figure 1).​[15]​ Although Jordan has liberalized somewhat since 1989, the government has pushed vocally critical deputies out of parliament, and the king has resorted to decrees and restricted civil liberties. That said, Jordan is very enthusiastic about the ENP and, together with Morocco and Tunisia, has been among the first Mediterranean countries to sign an Action Plan, which, from Jordan’s perspective, aligns very well with Jordan’s own initiated national reform agenda both in content and time table.​[16]​ In Egypt, President Mubarak has largely ruled by emergency law, has obstructed opposition forces, banned Muslim organizations, and restricted NGO activity. The 2000 elections were not free and fair. Syria is notoriously non-democratic, and in spite of Libya’s recent opening to the West, it still lacks political parties. The liberalization in Algeria in the mid-1990s failed to produce meaningful improvements, Islamist opposition is banned, and civil society activity is minimal. 
Most of the countries have benefited from participation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in 1995 (Ortega 2003), but although it contains clauses on human rights and democracy, the EU has not invoked these. While the EU had no formal relations with Syria, Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco have been among the union’s highest aid recipients. This has led “other Arab states themselves to question the EU’s genuine commitment to helping reform efforts (Youngs 2002, 11).” The last decade has also underscored that while the commission may have preferences regarding human rights and democracy, it is difficult to build consensus among member states to carry out a coherent policy in the region. As one official lamented: “The essential elements and the human rights rhetoric raises expectations. Then, Chirac is there being nice to [Tunesian President] Mr. Ben Ali.”
Europe’s credibility problem in this region also stems from the possibility that efforts to democratize could empower hostile extremist Islamic forces and destabilize the region. The goal of short-term stability therefore overshadows the goal of improving long-term prospects for democracy (Youngs 2002, 9). This has deterred the EU from implementing strict conditionality in the region. Criticism has been muted.​[17]​ For example, the 2004 country report on Tunisia states as a matter of fact and without further comment that: “The current President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, has been in power since 1987 and in the last elections in 1999 received 99.4% of the votes. The constitutional reform approved by referendum in May 2002 abolished the limit on the number of presidential mandates (EU Commission 2004b, 5).”
Faced with the ineffectiveness of its own policies, in May 2003 the Commission issued a communication on “Reinvigorating EU action on human rights and democratization with Mediterranean Partners.” However, the document leaves the impression that any deficit can be filled by creating sub-committees and encouraging more voluntary dialogue. Thus, a 2002 NGO report points to “the Community’s remarkable failure to establish any mechanism to ensure that the Association Agreements between the EU and its Mediterranean Partners which include a ‘Human Rights Clause’ (Article 2) are being implemented in accordance with this ‘essential element’, and thus coherently and consistently with overall EU policies. With regard to MEDA, despite clear signals of human rights commitment in the MEDA Regulation, only few specific programmes have been created to support human rights projects. Contrary to Community Development and Enlargement policies, essential human rights objectives are placed outside reform-centered policy and policy management focus (Byrne and Shamas 2002).” It is therefore as expected that, when asked whether the EU would be stressing mostly political or economic reforms or both, a Moroccan official replied that the political issues would not present a problem for Morocco and that therefore economic reforms that would top the agenda.​[18]​ 

WNIS and the Caucasus
The EU’s policies in the Caucasus and the WNIS have been more credible. With Ukraine and Moldova the EU has functioning Partnership and Cooperation agreements (PCA), but these do not grant preferential trade treatment. Nor has this approach been particularly successful (Haukkala and Moshes 2004).  The EU has raised political issues more frequently with the WNIS countries though demarches and dialogues. In countries like Moldova, where problems of drugs, human and arms trafficking and the Transnistrian conflict present serious threats, the EU cannot afford to turn its back. During Cooperation Council meetings, the EU has kept democracy and human rights issues on the agenda, but it has not really punished undemocratic practices in Moldova and Ukraine, choosing instead a policy of engagement. The annual Human Rights reports have criticized Belarus more than any other country, and since 1997 the EU has said that it cannot have contractual links with Belarus until it has established democratic government. Meanwhile, the EU has worked mostly to support civil society in Belarus (EU 2004, 4). This lends some credibility to the EU’s conditionality toward the region.
The EU has maintained relations with Ukraine and given over a billion Euros through TACIS, macro-financial assistance and humanitarian aid since 1991. It has also had an on-going political dialogue that included democracy and human rights issues. Ukraine is motivated to take the Action Plans seriously: Even before the orange revolution, Ukraine has stressed its desire to join the EU. Indeed, it has been paramount for Ukraine that the Action Plan should refer to the possibility of a closer relationship and should cover only 2-3 years. Indeed, after Yushchenko’s victory in the polls on 26th December, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner said the EU was ready to “go substantially beyond what was originally on offer: ‘We have set out ten areas where the EU is ready to step up its efforts to maximize the benefits the Action Plan will bring for Ukraine. This additional offer is a powerful signal: if Ukraine wishes to move closer to the EU, and is willing to implement the necessary actions to do so, then the EU will respond. I am confident that for the immediate future, many of Ukraine’s aspirations can be addressed in this framework.’”​[19]​ Two days after the finalization of the Action Plan, Yushchenko described it as precursor to EU entry talks.​[20]​ Indeed, Ukrainian officials, who do not accept the notion that Ukraine is in Europe’s neighborhood, have set a goal for a speedy reevaluation of the Action Plan, with the aim of prompting preparations for an Association Agreement that provides a clear membership perspective.​[21]​ Thus, Ukraine hopes that the ENP may very well become a springboard for membership, although the defeat of the EU constitutional treaty in national referenda may prolong this prospect. Moldova hopes to follow suit, but for now sees the ENP as “a very positive change”​[22]​. Although Belarus currently appears firmly outside any membership aspirations, it is thus clear that the WNIS countries are in a qualitatively different group than the other ENP countries. For them the enlargement template may indeed prove quite appropriate. 
The EU is more recently involved with the states in the Caucasus, which are the main source of EU energy. In 2003, the EU appointed a Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the EU supported democratic forces in so called pink Georgian revolution. However, in spite of international consensus that political conditions in Azerbaijan are severely undemocratic, EU criticism has been dampened since Azerbaijan is the largest EU trading partner in the Caucasus. Thus, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) went into effect in 1999, and the EU has focused on reducing tensions from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While the commission issued country reports for the Caucasian countries in March 2005, officials are also stressing that the development of Action Plans will depend on the countries behavior. 
Although the EU has some credibility with the WNIS and Caucasus, the EU has so far also not had much to show for its efforts. A TACIS working paper on reform of the TACIS program concludes that since 1999: “Across the board there has been little real progress towards democratisation and respect for human rights, and indeed there has been a tendency toward increased authoritarianism, with administrative and judicial systems which can be arbitrary and corrupt. Civil society remains weak, and the marginalisation of women has increased in the region.” ​[23]​ However, the recent revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine may finally bring opportunities for sustained change. Ukrainian officials report that they are talking with people in the commission “every day, every hour,” and that they have every intention of meeting as many of the requirements in the Action Plan as fast as possible.​[24]​ 

Conclusion
The ENP is a fascinating case study in organizational management theory. Its combination of socialization and conditionality exemplifies how the Commission relied on institutional learning and strategic adaptation from enlargement policies to expand its foreign policy domain. As Prodi said in a speech initiating the policy: “Let me try to explain what model we should follow. I admit that many of the elements which come to my mind are taken from the enlargement process (2002).” The Commission’s conceptualization and development of the ENP has drawn on multiple elements from the past enlargement experiences. Like enlargement, the policy combines socialization and conditionality strategies. In line with organizational theory on organizational adaptation to the external environment, the ENP is also an example of domain offense and creation: The ENP extends the foreign policy role that the Commission played during enlargement, and enables the Commission to continue playing a significant role in external affairs. 
The combination of learning and adaptation is occurring partly because many of the commission officials that worked on enlargement are now working on the ENP. This rooting in the enlargement portfolios led to some mechanical borrowing from enlargement experiences. Thus, some of the early drafts of the Action Plans were modeled directly on the traditional Association Agreements used for early stages of the recent accessions.​[25]​ The structure of dialogue and the bureaucratic organization to execute the policy is also similar. As with enlargement, the strategy paper and the Action Plans both tie progress into future reevaluations of the relationship. The use of an annual report resembles the progress reports for accession countries. This strives to emulate the “social influence” dynamic that existed with the annual progress reports for candidate countries, where the reports and attached progression towards benefits created competitiveness among the partner countries. To this end, the Commission has also retained the principle of differentiation, which was a key lesson from enlargement.
During the enlargement process, Commission officials sought to foster a discourse of democratization through a sense of a collaborative dialogue. The new ENP likewise refers to a partnership and “joint ownership.” And, as with enlargement, when negotiating the Action Plans, the EU aimed to align with reform-minded forces within the countries to facilitate their  influence on the domestic agenda. 
In sum, the ENP is clearly an effort to extend, or even emulate, the success of enlargement. Indeed, as one official said, the ENP is: “a diluted version of the enlargement policy.” But the neighbors are not current membership candidates and few have the potential of so becoming. The adapted enlargement template may not work. However, while one of the dangers of continuity in personnel from enlargement to ENP is a misplaced cookie-cutter approach, a potentially offsetting advantage is the very same ability of such officials to foster institutional learning. Indeed, officials do appreciate some of the differences. Nevertheless, there is clearly optimism that the better reference point for the ENP will be enlargement and not the past plethora of other EU democracy promotion efforts. 
How realistic is this?
If the goal is political reforms in the ENP countries similar to those achieved in the recent member states, it is important to consider the significantly lower starting points for the ENP countries in terms of common values. These differences matter, not just because they relate to the EU values, but also because they include important conditions for democratization. Political competition, a key factor in the enlargement success (Vachudova 2005), is only weakly present, and only in a few of the ENP countries.
Another obstacle is the EU’s historical relationship with the ENP countries. The Cold War prevented the EU from engaging extensively with the candidate countries, and in the early 1990s the EU had not yet developed a global democracy promotion strategy. The EU therefore had an almost clean slate of interaction with these countries. In contrast, the EU has long cooperated economically with the ENP countries, and in the last decade the EU’s human rights and democracy promotion agenda has grown. But, since many of these efforts were ineffective and political conditionality has been poorly implemented, this history presents more of a credibility problem than an asset.  The credibility problem is greatest in the Mediterranean countries where, in spite of formal human rights clauses in trade agreements, blatant violations of democratic standards have solicited only muted criticism. The EU’s history in the Caucasus and the WNIS has been more consistent, although a TACIS working paper concludes that human rights and democratization issues have actually worsened since 1999.​[26]​ 
As this article has shown, the EU has clearly adapted the ENP policy from the experience of enlargement. But I have also shown, the ENP countries are clearly a very different challenge both in terms of their starting points and their recent interactions with the EU. Thus, as much as the EU has to offer its neighbor states, the absence of the membership incentives for most countries should require significant adjustment, not just adaptation, of the enlargement strategy. The available policy tools are smaller, while the tasks in terms of political reforms are larger. Key political and economic factors that will influence effectiveness are outside the EU’s control, although the 2003 Rose revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine may provide the EU with policy windows (Kingdon 1984). Indeed, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, 
 already credits the ENP with aiding the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.​[27]​ But as a Ukrainian official points out: it is the “clear cut membership perspective” that will enable Ukraine to ask the people “to suffer under painful reforms” – not the ENP policy.​[28]​ Although fully aware that membership is not a possibility for Morocco, a Moroccan official noted that Morocco is eager to integrate economically with the EU but that it wants a clearer political vision for what the possible goals are.​[29]​
The EU does have something to offer its neighbors. There is a sense of excitement in some countries about the ENP. Therefore, the Commission’s adaptation of the strategies of enlargement to the region may work, and indeed the Commission will not be alone in working towards reforms: the Council of Europe, the United States and EU member states will also be among the actors pushing for reforms. But the obstacles to successful learning and its application are many (Hass 1991, Peters and Olsen 1996). Has the EU correctly identified the differences in the underlying situations? And will it appropriately adjust the policy from enlargement to the different circumstance? The challenges to the ENP are enormous. The dilemmas of how to implement ‘conditionality’ under multiple criteria (Kelley 2004a) are ever-present: When a country displays progress in energy, environment or competition policy, does the EU reward it with deeper cooperation, even if its democracy has worsened? Does the EU push for democracy if anti-EU politicians may gain power? How can the EU avoid further damage to its credibility after the inability of past policies to spur significant reforms in many of these countries? Further, socialization and cooptation of domestic reform-minded forces can at best only bear fruit in the long term. 
As Ukraine has noted and as multiple studies of enlargement have found, the membership perspective can help domestic publics accept painful reforms. Even with such a membership perspective, the case of Slovakia under Meciar in the mid 1990s showed that unreformed leaders who stood to loose personal power from political reforms were recalcitrant (Kelley 2004, Vachudova 2005). For many ENP countries, the combination of undemocratic leadership with the absence of a membership perspective bodes even more poorly for democratic and human rights reforms. Much will depend on the Commission’s ability to act consistently and not compromise on the political priorities. One official put it more idealistically, arguing that the policy might succeed: “If we have the courage of our convictions.” But if enlargement is indeed the comparison that the ENP policy hopes it is, those convictions will need strong enforcement, and at best, effects will be slow and uneven. 
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